A system may criticize religion for believing what cannot be independently demonstrated. It may warn against blind faith, authority, inherited doctrine, and untested claims.
But an
unavoidable question follows:
What
happens when those same standards are turned back upon the system itself?
If the
Meier framework distinguishes knowledge from belief by appealing to cognition,
experience, logic, evidence, and reality, then its claims concerning
extraterrestrial contacts, Nokodemion, reincarnation, Creation-energy, higher
realms, ancient history, and cosmic evolution must be measured by exactly the
same standard.
It asks a
more fundamental question:
When the
epistemological standards promoted within the Meier framework are applied to
the framework's own extraordinary claims, do those claims become established
knowledge—or do substantial portions remain matters accepted through testimony,
interpretation, authority, and personal conviction?
The
purpose is not ridicule, rejection, or hostility.
It is
simply the application of one rule to everyone—including the rule-maker.
One of
the strongest recurring themes within the Meier–FIGU material is the
distinction between belief and knowledge.
Belief is
frequently portrayed as something accepted without sufficient personal
cognition or direct understanding, while genuine knowledge is associated with
recognition, experience, logic, reality, and certainty acquired through one's
own development.
This
distinction deserves serious consideration.
DSPES
itself agrees with an essential part of that principle:
A claim
does not become true merely because someone believes it.
But the
principle immediately creates a second obligation.
If belief
must be tested, then the Meier framework cannot merely apply that test to
Christianity, religion, spiritualism, conventional cosmology, philosophy, or
competing extraterrestrial claims.
It must
submit itself to the same examination.
That
means asking whether a person who has never personally encountered the
Plejaren, witnessed the alleged conversations, entered the described
Creation-energy realms, remembered supposed previous personalities, verified
Nokodemion's alleged history, or independently confirmed the cosmological
hierarchy can properly call these propositions knowledge.
Or does
such a person necessarily depend upon something else?
Testimony.
Documents.
Translations.
Interpretation.
Trust.
Authority.
Personal
conviction.
And
belief.
This
distinction does not automatically prove the propositions false.
It
establishes something more limited but extremely important:
A
proposition may remain a belief for the recipient even if the original witness
sincerely claims to know it.
That is
the distinction this examination investigates.
Continue to: When a Belief Is Being Disguised as Knowledge The Critical Difference Between Conviction, Evidence, and Truth
Tagalog version is available: ANG MEIER FRAMEWORK NA INILAPAT SA SARILI NITO